Restriction on movement of minor

Restriction on movement of minor
Section 17 of Guardian and ward act…. Restriction on movement of ward/minor—direction by trial court not to remove the minor from the jurisdiction of the court— Legality—- welfare of minor—scope—while dismissing the application of father for permanent custody the trial court directed both the parties not to remove the ward from the jurisdiction of the court and to deposit the passport of the minor—Appellant court upheld the order of trial court on the basis that if the minor was removed from the jurisdiction of the trial court, the father would be deprived of visitation rights and would be seriously prejudiced. Held… that visiting rights of the father was only a part that played a role in the welfare and well-being of the child but it did not form the entire ingredient or composition oin the upbringing and grooming of the child…. Minor belonged to a family which could afford a better upbringing, education and environment either in Pakistan or anywhere in the world—courts below should not have seen welfare of the minor only from the angle that the father would miss his opportunity to see his child but it also had to be seen whether a ward who was capable of studying abroad, in case opportunities were available to him should be deprived on account of the fact that father must not miss his visiting opportunities – every child has its own peculiar circumstances and his welfare demand may vary – restriction on movement in the present case, appeared to be tool of settle core with the mother but it would not serve the welfare of the minor— High court set-aside the restrictions on movement of the ward and directed that the passport should be returned to the ward that the ward was at liberty to travel and to be admitted in any best available educational institution, be it is Pakistan or foreign country as desired by the mother however the selection of the institution shall be subject to approval and permission of the father that the father shall not be unreasonable in issuing no objection to the admission of the ward to any school, college or university , that any movement of the ward away from the foreign country where the mother desired to take the child for educational benefit or change of school and college etc. within or outside the foreign country, shall be subject to permission of the father, however he should not be unreasonable in considering such request or change of institute and should not withhold such permission in case it was meant for the welfare of the ward, that father was a liberty to visit the ward at least once in 15 days and or as many days as agreed between the parents, that insofar as the winter or summer vacations were concerned, father had to right to be with his son and father may travel to him, if he desired to spend vacation for any period which may not exceed 30 days during summer vacation and 15 days during winter vacations or the parties may set a schedule annually on such terms and conditions as they deemed fit and proper—constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly
2018 PLD Sindh 377

Damages for Breach of Contract

Damages for Breach of Contract
Common law damages for breach of contract—Principle such damages were intended to place the claimant in the same position as he would have been in had the contract been performed. Such damages were therefore normally based on the difference between the effect of performance and non-performance upon the claimant’s situation—where the breach of contractual obligations had caused the claimant to suffer loss, that loss should be measured or estimated as accurately and reliability as possible—Law tolerated imprecision and there were different legal principles which could assist in estimating the claimant loss- contract law damages could not be awarded merely for the purpose of depriving the defendant of profits made as a result of the breach except in exceptional circumstances—contract law damages were not a matter of discretion. They were claimed as of right and were awarded for refused on the basis of legal principles.
(2018 SCMR 1057 Supreme Court of UK)

IN CONJUGAL RIGHTS SUIT WIFE SEEKS RECOVERY OF MAINTENANCE AND DOWER

IN CONJUGAL RIGHTS SUIT WIFE SEEKS RECOVERY OF MAINTENANCE AND DOWER
Section 9(1a(1b) family court Act 1964…suit for restitution of conjugal rights by husband…. Wife seeking recovery of maintenance and dower in written statement…… Admissibility…. Obligations of husband to pay dower… scope.. Question was whether separate suit was required by wife for recovery of maintenance and dower… Petitioner/husband contended that wife in her written statement in family suit could claim dissolution of marriage only…. Respondent/wife contended that no separate suit was required for her claims of recovery of dower and maintenance allowance of minor… validity… under subsection 1a and 1b of section 9 of family court act 1964 either party could submit his/her claim in written statement…. Though in sub section (1b) the relief of only dissolution of Marriage including khula was mentioned as a claim to be set up by the wife, however in said sub section the word “including Khula “ was used which had enlarged its scope… Merely specifying the word dissolution of marriage including khula would not mean that wife could claim only such relief in her written statement but the word including used in section 9(1b) of Family Court Act, 1964 would enlarge it scope and the wife was not supposed to file separate suit for maintenance allowance of minor etc, instead all such claims could be joined in written statement… words used in the concluding para of sub section (1b) was also very relevant which supported the case of the wife. i.e. Shall be deemed as plaint and no separate suit shall lie for it. And it further strengthened the case of the wife, and whatever she claimed in her written statement would be considered as if she had filed a separate suit to such effect…. Father was morally and legally bound to maintain the children and he could not escape from the liability on any pretext even if the custody of the minor was with the mother… claim of dower of the wife was based upon a dower deed duly proved in the evidence and never rebutted in clear terms by the husband… payment of dower was obligatory upon husband which was the entitlement of wife as consideration of the marriage…Husband on contacting second marriage without permission of first wife or Arbitration council become liable to pay to first wife entire dower amount either prompt or deferred.. No illegality or infirmity having been noticed in the impugned judgment passed by the Appellant court, constitutional petition was dismissed accordingly.
2018 CLC 887 (Peshawar)

LIMITATION OF GRANT AND REVOCATION OF SUCCESSION CERTIFICATE

LIMITATION OF GRANT AND REVOCATION OF SUCCESSION CERTIFICATE
Secession Act (XXXIX of 1925)
Section 372 and 383 — succession certificate, grant/revocation of — limitation period — no statutory period of limitation was provided for grant of any succession certificate under section 372 or its revocation under section 383 of the succession Act 1925 but even then it had to be availed within reasonable time.
2018 SCMR 762

No Necessary for every legal heir to appear before the court for succession

No Necessary for every legal heir to appear before the court for succession
Secession Act (XXXIX of 1925)
Section 372— inheritance—succession certificate, issuance of—scope— Not necessary for each and every legal heir to be properly represented and appear before the court to get a succession certificate— court on receiving such application had to issue/grant succession certificate in favor of all the legal heirs by considering and determining their respective shares by complying with the procedural requirement of law in such regard.
2018 SCMR 762